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I. INTRODUCTION
The Industrial Revolution changed the American work force by cre-
ating large-scale industrial environments. Related changes included a
steady decrease in the percentage of self-employed workers and an in-
creased role for the government in the national economy. The Social
Security Act and disability insurance (DI) eventually emerged to aid
workers who had contributed their labor to the nation's work force, but
who could no longer contribute because of disability, old age, or
death.' This article will examine the types of risks which the disability
program was designed to cover2 and will consider how self-employed
workers have been treated under the program.' It will then argue that
the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the courts, although
seemingly harsher on self-employed workers than on wage and salaried
ones, are actually recognizing the ability of each group of claimants to
cope with the types of risks each may encounter.
II. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE DISABILITY
INSURANCE PROGRAM
Disability determinations have a detailed review process.4 A claim-
ant begins by applying at a district SSA office. If he has worked
enough hours to be eligible for Social Security benefits, he is referred to
a state agency which makes an "initial determination" based on federal
guidelines.5 The agency may be a vocational rehabilitation service,
which employs both doctors and vocational specialists.6 The SSA may
1. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 22-26, disability insurance was not included
in the Social Security System until 1956.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 22-52.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 53-95.
4. Note that the SSA also administers the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.
Established in 1972, SSI provides benefits to the aged, blind, and disabled "who do not have
sufficient income and resources to maintain a standard of living at the established Federal mini-
mum income level." 20 C.F.R. § 416.110 (1983). SSI has the same disability definition as that of
the DI program. Id. § 416.905(a) (1983). For an excellent discussion of SSI and its relationship to
the Old Age Survivors Disability and Health Insurance Program, see P. GRIMALDI, SUPPLEMEN-
TAL SECURITY INCOME (1980).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 414 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.902-.1503(a) (1983). See also
id. §§ 404.1505-.1575.
6. Popkin, Effect of Representation in Nonadversary Proceedings-A Study ofThree Disability
Programs, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 999 (1977).
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make the initial determination if a state declines to do so or if the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services (HHS) decides that a state has
"substantially failed" to make the determination according to the fed-
eral guidelines.7 The SSA may also reverse a state agency's finding
that a claimant is or is not disabled.8
A disappointed claimant may begin the informal and non-adversary
administrative review process; new evidence may be added at every
stage.9 Approximately thirty percent of the unsuccessful claimants pro-
ceed to the first stage and seek a reconsideration by state agencies.,'
Claimants may next appeal for a hearing with an administrative law
judge (ALJ) in the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals. " The last admin-
istrative stage is the Appeals Council Review in Washington, D.C.' 2
Claimants may seek review themselves or the Appeals Council may
initiate a review on its own. The Appeals Council may decide the
claim itself or remand the claim to the AL.'
After the Appeals Council review, the SSA's decision is final and
review must be taken to a federal district court.'4 Judicial review is
limited to the substantial evidence test and federal judges are not sup-
posed to substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary.' 5 In 1980
district courts affirmed eleven percent of the claims and remanded
forty-one percent to the Appeals Council; forty-eight percent were de-
nied.' 6 Claimants may also obtain judicial review through an Expe-
dited Appeals Process at any time after the initial determination and
before the SSA's final decision. '" Expedited appeals, however, are lim-
7. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1503(a) (1983).
8. Id § 404.1503(d).
9. Id § 404.900(b). See also J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P.
VERKUIL & M. CARROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS at xvi (1978) (hereinafter
cited as J. MASHAW].
10. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907-.921 (1983); Popkin, supra note 6, at 999. This stage in the appeals
process was not mandatory until 1959. Note that the Bureau of Disability Insurance selects 10%
for quality control review. 1d In 1980 15% of the reconsiderations were successful. STAFF OF
THE SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 97TH CONG.,
IST SESS., REPORT ON STATUS OF THE DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 31 (Comm. Print 1981)
[hereinafter cited as 1981 REPORT ON STATUS OF THE D.I. PROGRAM].
11. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929-.961 (1983). In 1980 65% of the reconsideration losses were ap-
pealed; 58% of the claimants receiving hearings were successful. 1981 REPORT ON STATUS OF THE
D.I. PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 31.
12. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967-.983 (1983). In 1980 five percent were allowed; eight percent were
remanded to the ALJ. Of the 85% denied, 20% of the claims were appealed to U.S. district courts.
1981 REPORT ON STATUS OF THE D.I. PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 31.
13. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.976-.977 (1983). All of the decision makers at this stage are lawyers.
Popkin, supra note 6, at 1001.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
15. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981-.983 (1983). This is the same test which the Appeals Council ap-
plies. J. MASHAW, supra note 9, at 125.
16. 1981 REPORT ON STATUS OF THE D.I. PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 31.
17. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.923-.928 (1983).
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DISABILITY CLAIMANTS
ited to constitutional challenges; they are not for review of findings of
fact or conclusions of law.' 8
Upon claimant request, the SSA may also reopen or revise its deter-
minations or decisions.' 9 Within twelve months of the initial determi-
nation, a claim may be reopened for any reason. Within four years, it
may be reopened for "good cause"; this includes discovery of "new and
material" evidence or clerical errors in computing benefits.2 ° A claim
may be reopened at any time for fraud.2'
III. TYPES OF RISKS WHICH DISABILITY INSURANCE COVERS
Historically, the DI program was included in the 1956 amendments
of the Social Security Act.22 The Social Security Act was passed in
1935 as part of Franklin Roosevelt's response to high unemployment
and to the inability of various elements in society to support them-
selves.3 Although the 1935 Act did not include disability insurance,
executive committees and Congress continued to study the issue.24
18. Id. § 404.900(a)(6).
19. Id §§ 404.987-.995.
20. Id §§ 404.988-.989.
21. Id § 404.988(c)(1).
22. Social Security Amendments of 1956, PUB. L. No. 84-880, §§ 223-225, 70 Stat. 807, 815-
17 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 416).
23. Inaddition to unemployment compensation, the Social Security Act provided old age
benefits for workers in industry and commerce, health care services for pregnant women and
young children, and public assistance for the blind and children under 16 who were without other
means of support. M. DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY !1 (1979). The benefits
were initially financed by a one percent payroll tax on employees and employers who had a mini-
mum base wage of at least $3000. Id at 429. Revenues were deposited in a trust fund, from
which payments began on January 1, 1937. Id To administer the programs, a three-member
Social Security Board (SSB) was established. In 1946 the SSB was abolished and the Social Se-
curity Administration (SSA) took over its function. Id. at 433. Arthur J. Altmeyer, who had been
chairman of the SSB since 1937, became the first commissioner of the SSA, a position he held
until 1953. Id at 433-34. When the SSA came under the supervision of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in 1953, the commissioner was henceforth appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. d. at 433. A further reorganization in
1963 created the Welfare Administration which took over the public assistance programs and left
the SSA responsible for only the insurance program. Id. at 18 n. 1, 433. As the insurance program
expanded, additional subunits were added to the SSA. As of 1972, the SSA included the follow-
ing: Office of the Commissioner, Office of the Actuary, Office of Administration, Office of Public
Affairs, Office of Program Evaluation and Planning, Office of Research and Statistics, Bureau of
Disability Insurance, Bureau of District Office Operations, Bureau of Data Processing, Bureau of
Hearings and Appeals, Bureau of Health Insurance, Bureau of Retirement and Survivors Insur-
ance, and Office of the General Council. Id. at 18 n.l.
24. The Committee on Economic Security, the cabinet-level group that planned the Presi-
dent's social welfare proposals in 1934, recommended that such a program receive additional
study. M. DERTHICK, supra note 23, at 296. A trickle of congressional support began in 1939, but
a disability program did not receive serious attention until the early 1950s. In response to congres-
sional conservatives who felt that states should have sole responsibility for handling "total disabil-
ity" cases, Congress went only as far as providing assistance grants to states in 1950. Id at 299-
300. Note that the assistance grants were based on state determinations of individual need. Social
Security Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-734, § 351, 64 Stat. 477, 555.
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Congress enacted "disability freezes" in 1952 and 1954 to protect dis-
abled workers from losing their eligibility for Old Age and Survivors
Insurance benefits during periods of disability.25 DI finally became law
in 1956; it was financed by a .025% increase in the payroll tax and
maintained through control of a separate trust fund.26
To evaluate the current administration of DI, it is first necessary to
understand the types of risks which the program was designed to cover
at both the societal and the individual levels.
A. Societal Level
Industrialized societies often decide to provide disability insurance
when industrial workers become an increasingly important factor in the
production of national wealth.27 In the United States between 1911
and 1920, most states adopted worker's compensation laws-somewhat
foreshadowing the federal disability program.28 Industrial accidents
had become "inevitable hazards of modem industry"; hence, employ-
ers gradually assumed their employees' expenses as a "legitimate cost
of production. ' 29 At the same time, the federal government began pro-
viding benefits and rehabilitation programs for veterans who, after
serving to defend their country, had become disabled.3" The position
of industrial workers was analogous to the veterans' position; the work-
ers braved technically-complicated and often dangerous environments
to help build up and maintain the nation's economic strength. To in-
sure continuing economic growth, it was reasonable for society to ab-
sorb the costs of industrial accidents and eventually to provide
disability insurance for its work force.3'
25. Due to a congressional battle involving lobbyists from the American Medical Association
(AMA), the insurance industry, and the Chamber of Commerce, the initial disability freeze was
severely limited in application; it expired on June 30, 1953, and applications from disabled work-
ers were not received until July 1, 1953. M. DERTHICK, supra note 23, at 300-02. The AMA
feared that the freeze would involve direct involvement with the federal government and eventu-
ally lead to socialized medicine; the debate on health insurance had already made socialized
medicine an issue at the time. Id at 301-02. A less stringent freeze was passed in 1954. Social
Security Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-761, § 106, 68 Stat. 1052, 1079 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 413-417).
26. M. DERTHICK, supra note 23, at 308, 431. It is interesting to note that although the Eisen-
hower administration had supported the disability freeze because of its emphasis on rehabilita-
tion, it initially opposed outright cash benefits. Id at 304.
27. C. SAFILIOS-ROTHSCHILD, THE SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF DISABILITY
AND REHABILITATION 15 (1970).
28. Id at 19.
29. Id at 20.
30. Id at 19-20.
31. There were nevertheless elements in society, such as the AMA and the insurance indus-
try, which were initially very hostile to DI. See supra note 25. Faced with limited lobbying re-
sources and more pressing issues such as national health insurance, these groups subsequently had
less incentive to lobby against the incremental changes in the DI program. Physicians, who al-
ready had established working relationships with state agencies, gradually realized that they could
4
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Providing for the disabled was also necessary because of the social
changes which accompanied the Industrial Revolution. In the pre-in-
dustrial agricultural society, extended families could take care of the
sick and disabled. A more urbanized society with nuclear families,
however, could not provide all the traditional services. Consequently,
social institutions had to assume many of the extended family's
functions.32
Finally, an industrialized society may be less tolerant of disabilities
than its pre-industrial ancestors. High production levels and efficiency
are continually stressed today. Both physical and mental behavioral
deviations could disrupt the otherwise smooth functioning of the pro-
duction line.33 Due to this intolerance for disabling characteristics, one
commentator has suggested that "disability" more accurately repre-
sents the low value an individual's labor merits in the market, given
alternatives such as machines and healthy workers.34 Disability is now
"as much a function of social choices as it is a result of illness or
injury. 35
B. Individual Level
Although the scope of the DI program was initially restricted,36 sub-
sequent amendments expanded the piogram to protect additional indi-
viduals against the risk of disability.37 Currently, disability is defined
live with the DI system without feeling "socialized or regimented." M. DERTHICK, supra note 23,
at 311-14.
32. C. SAFILIOS-ROTHSCHILD, supra note 27, at 21.
33. Id at 127.
34. Liebman, The Defiition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income:
Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REV. 833, 852 (1976).
35. Id
36. Disability was defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to
result in death or to be of long-continued and indefinite duration." Social Security Amendments
of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, § 223(c)(2), 70 Stat. 807, 815 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 416). Thus
temporary or short-term disability was not covered, even if the disability was total. The benefits
were also limited to claimants aged 50 and older, with no -benefits going to their dependents. The
benefits would be further reduced by the amount received from other sources, such as workmen's
compensation. Claimants must have worked six out of the last 13 employment quarters, so as to
demonstrate their attachment to the work force. Lastly, there was a six month waiting period
before benefits would be dispersed. M. DERTHICK, supra note 23, at 308.
37. As the originally hostile groups lost interest in DI, new pressure groups began influencing
Congress. Even though they remained unorganized, beneficiaries and potential claimants com-
plained to their Congressmen about delays, restrictions, and denials in their program. M.
DERTHICK, supra note 23, at 311-14. In 1958 dependent benefits were added, the prior work
requirement was modified, and the offset for income from other programs was dropped (although
partially restored in later years). Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-840,
§§ 201-205, 72 Stat. 1013, 1020-25 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-423). The age requirement was
eliminated in 1960. Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, § 401, 74 Stat. 924,
967 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 423). Temporary disability was added in 1967. Although the defini-
tion always included disability which could be expected to result in death, the duration was
5
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as:
the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than twelve months. . . . To determine whether you
are able to do any work, we consider your residual functional capacity
and your age, education, and work experience.38
This definition includes three elements relating to the types of disability
covered by the DI program.
First, individual claimants must have participated in the nation's
work force.39 This prior work requirement not only demonstrates a
claimant's willingness to work; it also assures the claimant, if he
achieves a certain level of income, that the government will insure him
against losing that level because of disability.4" In a limited way, the
DI program protects one's achieved social status.
Second, the DI program provides benefits to only claimants who lose
their employment because of a "medically determinable" disability.4"
Originally, the DI program covered only claimants who were at least 50
years old because they were less likely to be rehabilitated.42 The pro-
gram now protects workers of all ages against the risk of losing their
employment because of the onset of a disability. Consequently, the
medical factor currently serves to distinguish between disability and
either unwillingness to work for non-medical reasons or unemployment
due to voluntary causes, such as laziness, early aging, or drinking.4 3
changed from "long-continued and indefinite duration" to "can be expected to last for a continued
period of twelve months." Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 158(b), 81
Stat. 821, 868. In 1972 the waiting period was reduced from six to five months. M. DERTHICK,
supra note 23, at 309.
One should note that the 1967 amendments called for a more precise definition of disability and
are generally considered more restrictive. See infra text accompanying notes 107-08; S. REP. No.
2, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2880-83.
38. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a) (1983). Note that individual workers contribute to the DI trust
fund through a payroll tax, with the understanding that they will receive DI benefits if they be-
come "disabled" under the law.
39. Id §§ 404.110-.146 (discussing how a claimant obtains insured status). One should note
that the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program does not have a prior work requirement.
See 20 Id § 416.202.
40. Liebman, supra note 34, at 842.
41. Note that Appendix 2 to Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 and Subpart I of Regulation No.
16 list impairments which are considered so severe that claimants with such impairments will
automatically be considered disabled for DI and SSI benefits, unless the record includes evidence
to the contrary. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1517, 416.917 (1983).
42. M. DERTHICK, supra note 23, at 341.
43. Liebman, supra note 34, at 843. The medical disability requirement also attempts to deal
with claimants who have the same physical ailment, but who claim differing degrees of pain. Id
at 844. Currently the SSA evaluates pain "on the basis of a medically determinable impairment
which can be shown to be the cause of the [pain];" pain alone cannot be the only basis of finding
disability unless a "medical condition... could be reasonably expected to produce [the pain]."
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1983).
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Finally, a claimant's disability must be total. Even though an indi-
vidual cannot engage in his former employment, he may have to take
different or lower-paying work if he is able." The total disability re-
quirement can be attributed to various factors. Procedurally, it helps
the SSA distribute a limited number of funds by insuring that the most
needy--or the most disabled-receive benefits.45 It further eliminates
the problem of determining "partial" disability-a process which could
greatly increase the cost of the DI program.46 One commentator has
also suggested that this requirement is an attempt to treat partially dis-
abled workers like workers who have always had lower paying jobs.47
As some individuals must perform "disagreeable and low-paid jobs" in
our economy, it may be inequitable to treat the partially disabled as
having a greater "claim on society. ' 48 Unless they are totally disabled,
claimants should not receive benefits as an alternative to accepting
lesser paying jobs.49
Although the insurance theme often dominates discussion of DI,
there is also a quasi-welfare aspect of the program." By requiring total
disability, DI assures that completely disabled workers will have at
least a minimum income. As discussed below,5' a claimant may even
earn a maximum amount per month and still be eligible for DI. The
welfare aspect is also demonstrated by the fact that there is no relation-
ship between a claimant's benefits and the amount of his individual
contribution, as there is in private insurance programs.5
2
IV. GUIDELINES FOR SELF-EMPLOYED DISABILITY CLAIMANTS
The DI program aids both self-employed and wage and salary work-
ers who have contributed their labor to the nation's work force, but
who can no longer contribute because of disability.53 To establish disa-
bility, claimants must show that they are not only disabled from engag-
ing in their known occupations, but that they also cannot engage in any
other "substantial gainful activity" (SGA) which "exists in the national
economy."54 There are two independent components of SGA: sub-
44. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b)(3), .1574-.1575 (1983).
45. Liebman, supra note 34, at 848. This will not apply for claimants with impairments that
are automatically considered disabling. See supra note 41.
46. Liebman, supra note 34, at 848.
47. Id at 849.
48. 1d
49. 1d
50. Id at 848-49.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 68-69.
52. Liebman, supra note 34, at 841.
53. S. REP. No. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
7
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stantial and gainful.55 Through the authority granted to the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare by Congress,56 the Social Security
Administration has promulgated regulations to explain these compo-
nents further.57
In addition to the general regulations which apply to all claimants,
there are separate regulations which specifically cover self-employed
workers.5" In order to be substantial, a self-employed worker must per-
form "significant" mental or physical services for his business. 9 The
activity must also be gainful in that the worker receives "substantial"
income from his business.6" In reviewing disability cases, the courts
have expanded the meaning of these guidelines and even added criteria
of their own.
A. Hours
The SSA considers any services performed by a claimant to be sig-
nificant if the claimant works entirely by himself.6 ' If other persons are
involved in the business, the claimants' services are significant if they
either account for more than one-half of the management time or total
over forty-five hours per month.62
The courts give considerable weight to hours spent at work; however,
they also consider other factors. For example, the claimant in Icenhour
v. Weinberger63 spent fifteen to twenty hours per week (i.e., over forty-
five hours per month) at his dry goods store; however, the court held
that he was not engaging in SGA because he made only ten percent of
the management decisions. Similarly, in Scanlon v. Richardson64 the
claimant performed only small irregular tasks at his auto repair shop.
The court found that he was not engaged in SGA even though he came
to work every day. In Wesley v. Secretary of Health, Education and
We/fare 65 the claimant was engaged in SGA when working only three
hours per day. Although he worked fewer hours than before his disa-
bility, Wesley nevertheless performed significant "supervisory and ad-
"166visory services. The same reasoning applied to the claimant in Price
55. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572 (1983).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(4) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
57. In the 1983 regulations, SGA is defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571-.1575 (1983).
58. Id § 404.1575 (covering self-employed workers).
59. Id § 404.1575(a)(3), .1575(b).
60. Id
61. Id § 404.1575(b)(1).
62. Id
63. 375 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
64. 370 F. Supp. 1141 (W.D. Pa. 1972). As discussed infra text accompanying notes 83-89,
claimant only performed such tasks at the advice of his doctor.
65. 385 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1974).
66. Id at 865.
8
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v. Richardson67 who contributed "significant management expertise"
six days per week to his business. Thus, the courts generally follow the
hours regulations unless the work performed is too insignificant to be
considered SGA.
B. Income
The SSA also examines employee earnings to determine whether a
claimant is capable of SGA. Since 1979, a self-employed disability
claimant has been allowed to earn up to $300.00 per month.68 When a
claimant's earnings exceed this $300.00 per month total, his ability to
engage in SGA is sufficiently established. 69  These income guidelines
become inapplicable in two distinct types of situations.
At one end of the spectrum are claimants who draw substantial in-
come from their businesses, but who nevertheless maintain that their
income does not reflect their ability to work. SSA regulations specifi-
cally provide that income will not be considered alone when it can be
attributed to other factors, such as capital investments or profit sharing
agreements. 70 The claimant in Tucker v. Schweiker7 1 averaged $800.00
per month from his transportation business. The court, however, held
that Tucker was disabled because the income reflected earnings on cap-
ital assets: ownership of a truck and business relationships established
before the onset of his disability.72 In Icenhour v. Weinberger the court
found that the claimant's half of a $20,000 partnership income could be
attributed to a profit-sharing agreement with his wife-not to his own
significant work activities.73
At the other end of the spectrum are the claimants whose incomes do
not exceed the established amount, but whose activities still reflect an
ability to engage in SGA. In Smith v. Weinberger74 the claimant real-
ized a net annual loss of $165.00 from selling gems on a part-time basis.
67. 443 F.2d 347, 348 (5th Cir. 1971).
68. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(b) (1983). The earnings limit remains $300.00 per month as of
1983.
69. Id
70. Id. § 404.1575(a).
71. 650 F.2d 62, 63 (5th Cir. 1981). Although the claimant spent only two to three hours per
month involved with this business, his services were the only managerial duties performed for the
business.
72. Id at 64.
73. 375 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). See also Krumme v. Califano, 451 F. Supp. 941
(W.D. Mo. 1978) ($15,174.81 annual earnings reflected income from capital assets where claimant
supplied money for farm equipment and grain in sharecropping arrangement with his son); Mc-
Cleery v. Finch, 332 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (large annual income resulted from sale of
inventory in claimant's welder shop); Scanlon v. Richardson, 370 F. Supp. 1141 (W.D. Pa. 1972)
(income reflected return on capital invested in auto garage business which claimant had built up
over his life; therefore, income "in the nature of repayment of capital invested in the business in
the nature of loans" was analogized to stock dividends). Id at 1142.
74. 381 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Wis. 1974), af'd, 525 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1975).
9
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Nonetheless, the court found that Smith had demonstrated a "func-
tional capacity to engage in SGA" by grossing over $8,000.00." Simi-
larly, in Beasley v. Califano the claimant apparently earned no profits
in his small real estate business.16 The court denied his appeal for disa-
bility benefits, emphasizing a gap in the record due to claimant's re-
fusal to disclose his actual income and his "persistent" efforts to run the
business. 7
The income regulations are applied unless a claimant's income,
whether above or below the $300.00 limit, does not adequately reflect
his ability to engage in SGA. If income is either too high because of
investment earnings or too low despite significant work activity, the
guidelines will not be followed.
C. Sheltered Work Environments
Regardless of a claimant's earnings or the number of hours he
spends at work, a "sheltered" work environment may negate his ability
to engage in SGA.78 If a claimant is "incapable of securing and main-
taining a competitive job . . . in the absence of close supervision," the
work activity will not constitute evidence of SGA.79 Although shel-
tered work environments generally arise only for wage and salary
workers, they may also be relevant for self-employed workers. At least
one court allowed benefits for a blind claimant whose work exceeded
the regulatory requirements, because he worked in a sheltered environ-
ment. In Cox v. Cohen80 the court held that the claimant was disabled
even though he operated his vending machine ten hours per day, five
days per week, and earned more than the regulatory maximum.8' The
claimant's work was "sheltered" because he received assistance from
his suppliers and customers in arranging and operating his vending
stand. 2 Thus, neither the hour nor the income regulations will be ap-
plied if a disability claimant works in a sheltered work environment.
D. Doctor's Orders
The SSA will consider statements by a claimant's physician that a
claimant is "disabled," but it reserves the right to look at other medical
75. Id. at 409.
76. 608 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1979).
77. Id at 1167.
78. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1573(c), .1574(a)(3) (1983).
79. Woodhead v. Califano, 479 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (D. Neb. 1979).
80. 321 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69. See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(b)(2) (1983).
82. 321 F. Supp. at 537. The court also noted a congressional intent to "make it easier for
aging blind person(s) to obtain disability benefits." Id at 538 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(B)
(1976)).
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evidence to support such statements.83  Some courts go further and
show explicit deference to doctors' recommendations to particular
claimants. The court in Icenhour noted that the claimant could not
engage in SGA "without gravely endangering his health."84 By con-
trast, the Wesley court partially based its denial of benefits on the fact
that the claimant's doctor said he could perform administrative work.8 5
In both Scanlon86 and Rivas v. Weinberger,87 the courts emphasized
that the claimants worked at their businesses only because their physi-
cians had advised them to keep busy. When other factors are predomi-
nant, however, the doctor's recommendation may not be followed.88
For example, in Beasley89 the claimant was found able to engage in
SGA even though his doctor had advised him not to work. In review-
ing disability claims, the courts thus may take it upon themselves to
emphasize a doctor's opinion.
E. Burden of Proof
Some courts have devised their own procedural guidelines by allo-
cating the burden of proof in DI cases.90 Generally, the courts require
claimants to prove that they can no longer engage in their known occu-
pations because of their disabilities. 91 The burden then shifts to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to show that there is nonethe-
less SGA in the national economy which the claimant can perform.92
To support its denial of DI benefits, the SSA may bring in vocational
experts to discuss the types of jobs which exist for workers with the
particular claimant's capacities.9" As of February 26, 1979, the SSA
83. For list of "Medical Considerations" for determining disability and blindness, see 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1525-.1530 (1983).
84. 375 F. Supp. at 318. See supra note 63.
85. 385 F. Supp. at 865-66. See supra note 64.
86. 370 F. Supp. at 1142. See supra note 65.
87. 475 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1973).
88. Another interesting problem arises because of the "traditional patient-doctor relation-
ship" where the doctor is encouraged to act on his patient's behalf. Accordingly, the reports of
"attending physicians" may be given less weight than those of "consultant specialists"; the attend-
ing physicians can be expected to protect their clients' interests when providing disability reports.
See S. NAGi, DISABILITY AND REHABILITATION 78-79 (1969).
89. 608 F.2d at 1166. See also supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
90. A few courts placed both burdens on the claimant. Storyk v. Secretary of Health, Educ.
& Welfare, 462 F. Supp. 152, 153-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Others only discussed a general definition
of disability which the claimant had the burden of establishing. Kutchman v. Cohen, 425 F.2d 20
(7th Cir. 1970); Harris v. Richardson, 450 F.2d 1099, 1101 (4th Cir. 1971).
91. See Camp v. Schweiker, 643 F.2d 1325, 1332 (8th Cir. 1981); Salas v. Califano, 612 F.2d
480, 482 (10th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. Harris, 612 F.2d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1980); Diabo v. Secretary
of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 627 F.2d 278, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Stark v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d
1092 (7th Cir. 1974).
92. Id
93. For a discussion of the use of vocational experts in administrative hearings, see J.
MASHAW, supra note 9, at 74-79.
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has also been able to use vocational regulations to prove that a claim-
ant still has the residual functional capacity to engage in some form of
SGA.94
Using both SSA and their own guidelines, courts have reviewed disa-
bility claims for self-employed workers. As noted above, 95 the DI pro-
gram emerged in the Industrial Revolution to protect employees in
large industrial workplaces. It is, therefore, important to consider
whether self-employed claimants are accorded the same treatment as
their wage and salary counterparts in industry and commerce.
V. COMPARISON OF SELF-EMPLOYED AND WAGE AND SALARY
CLAIMANTS
At first glance the DI cases seem to draw the line fairly between dis-
abled claimants and those capable of SGA. When comparing self-em-
ployed workers with wage and salary employees, however, the courts
seem stricter with self-employed claimants.
Due to intrinsic differences in the two work situations, the self-em-
ployed worker may be penalized for continuing to work part-time after
the onset of disability. For example, the Wesley claimant had the same
"Class III" heart condition as the wage and salary claimant in Meneses
v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,96 but Meneses was
found to be disabled. The Wesley court distinguished the cases because
Wesley was able to return to his work part-time as landlord of a build-
ing he owned; Meneses, on the other hand, was completely discharged
from military service and was unable to secure new employment be-
cause of his heart trouble.97 A wage and salary worker may not have
the option to continue working part-time because his technical, indus-
trial work environment cannot tolerate the inefficiency which his disa-
bility creates.98 It seems inequitable, however, to award this worker DI
benefits when a self-employed worker with the same disability would
be denied benefits.
94. See Appendix 2 to Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 of the Social Security Regulations
(Title II, 1983). See also Goldhammer, The Effect of New Vocational Regulations on Social Secur-
ity and Supplemental Security Income Disability Claims, 32 AD. L. REV. 501 (1980) (Goldhammer,
an administrative law judge, considers the effect that these new regulations will have on the indi-
vidualized adjudicative process); Welch, New Disability Insurance Regulations, 58 MicH. B.J. 330
(1979). Note that on June 21, 1982, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Campbell v. Secretary of
Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 665 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-1983, to
decide whether the Secretary may rely on the medical-vocational guidelines, as opposed to indi-
vidualized proof, in disability determinations. 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 27-35.
96. 442 F.2d 803 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
97. 385 F. Supp. at 866. The Meneses claimant was discharged from a position as a Scout in
the Philippines. Perhaps the court was influenced by a concern for the veteran's role in society.
See supra text accompanying note 30.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 [1984], Art. 12
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss2/12
DISABILITY CLAIMANTS
The ability to continue working part-time also translates into a pro-
cedural disadvantage for self-employed workers. When a wage and
salary worker can no longer perform in his industrial setting, he may
lose his job and then apply for disability benefits. This worker can
meet his burden of proof simply by showing that his disability prevents
him from engaging in his known occupation.99 The burden of proof
then shifts to the Secretary of HHS who must show that the claimant
can still perform some form of SGA in the national economy.'00 The
burden of proof, however, never shifts to the Secretary in a self-em-
ployed worker's case, if the worker can continue to work part-time at
his known occupation. Consequently, wage and salary workers may
have a better chance of obtaining DI benefits.
When interpreting the income regulations, the courts and the SSA
generally treat the two types of workers alike. As his own boss, a self-
employed worker takes the additional risk that his business will not be
profitable. Although he may earn less than the regulatory amount or
realize a loss in his business, the self-employed worker will not receive
disability benefits unless he is totally disabled.' If he cannot support
himself and his family, he may have to turn to social welfare benefits.
A problem arises because self-employed workers often have capital
investments in their businesses. For DI purposes, income earned from
capital investments is not considered evidence of SGA. 0 2 A self-em-
ployed claimant may be penalized, however, when his capital invest-
ments overlap with or cannot be clearly distinguished from his
employment. If he becomes disabled and still spends time in his for-
mer workplace managing "investments," he may be considered capable
of engaging in SGA. He could still be legally disabled if he was simply
looking after unrelated personal investments in real estate or securities.
A wage and salary claimant, on the other hand, is more likely to sepa-
rate clearly his investment and employment activities and may be
awarded benefits for doing so. A similarly disabled self-employed
claimant could be denied benefits because his investments are in his
business.
On the societal level, there is a simplistic reason for distinguishing
between self-employed and wage and salary workers. Worker's com-
pensation laws and disability insurance were not developed for self-
employed workers. Rather, they were developed for wage and salary
workers, who had to work in the new technically dangerous facto-
ries. 0 3 The self-employed may not be deemed as important to the eco-
99. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95.
100. Id.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
102. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1575(a) (1983).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
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nomic strength of the country, or they may simply not be as important
to Congress because they lack the organization of unionized industrial
workers. This explanation is inadequate for those who maintain that
an adequate number of self-employed workers is necessary for a nation
to remain competitive internationally.' °4 In addition, both types of
claimants may suffer if their nuclear families cannot provide for them
as well as the extended families provided for disabled members in pre-
industrialized society.10 5
On the individual level, there may be a better explanation of the dif-
ferent treatment accorded the two groups. Although both types of
claimants know that they will receive benefits only if they are totally
disabled, they are able to react differently to the risks of partial disabil-
ity. Since the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act, all DI
claimants risk being caught in the "job gap."" Claimants may be un-
able to perform their known occupations or any other occupation in
their localities; but if there is any SGA which they can perform in the
national economy, they may be denied DI benefits.' All workers risk
having to accept different or lower-paying work if they are only par-
tially disabled.10 8
Self-employed workers may avoid the "job gap" predicament be-
cause of the nature of their occupations. Like their wage and salary
counterparts, partially disabled self-employed workers may not be able
to do the same work which they did previously; however, self-em-
ployed workers may not be plunged into the "job gap" if they can
restructure their businesses to cope with their impairments. They may
be able to work part-time, do less strenuous tasks, or capitalize on in-
vestments in their businesses. In addition to adapting financially to dis-
ability, self-employed workers may also be better situated to deal
psychologically with their disability if they can remain present at their
businesses. 109
104. See Salowsky, The Decline in Self-Employed in Industrial Countries, INTERECONOMICS
Nov./Dec. 1978, at 306.
105. See supra text accompanying note 32.
106. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 158(d)(2)(A), 81 Stat. 821,
868 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); Liebman, supra note 34, at 853-
54.
107. Id
108. See supra text accompanying note 44.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87. As their doctors had recommended that these
claimants continue going to work, the courts permitted their presence in their former workplaces
without penalizing them. Unlike claimants who are capable of working part-time, the "Doctor's
Orders" claimants can neither compete for jobs in the national work force nor contribute their
labor to the nation's economy. The courts perhaps acknowledged the psychological benefits
gained from simply being present at the business they had built up over a lifetime. The situation
is similar to that of self-employed workers who can partially retire and thereby soften the "psycho-
logical and financial trauma that often accompanies sudden and complete retirement." Retirement
Patterns for Self-Employed Workers, 43 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 24 (Oct. 1980).
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Wage and salary workers do not have the advantage of being able to
restructure their work environments. In technically efficient produc-
tion lines, their ability to continue working is dependent on the alterna-
tive labor sources in the marketplace, such as machines and healthy
workers." 0 Although they are only partially disabled, they may never-
theless have to change their occupation and look for alternative work
in the national economy. Partially disabled wage and salary workers
consequently run a greater risk of being caught in the "job gap."
VI. CONCLUSION
Unless the SSA is prepared to make partial disability determina-
tions,"' the DI program may be functioning as adequately as possible
by allocating the limited resources to the neediest claimants. In certain
circumstances," l 2 the courts seem harsher on self-employed claimants
because the self-employed may be in a position to continue working
part-time. The more stringent treatment, however, may be explained
by the fact that self-employed workers are generally better able to deal
with the risks of partial disability.'13
RHONDA L. BRAUER*
110. See supra text accompanying note 34.
111. For a discussion of countries which make partial disability determinations, see INTERNA-
TIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY ASSOCIATION, SIXTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT VII. INSUR-
ANCE FOR SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS AGAINST EMPLOYMENT ACCIDENTS AND OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASES (1968).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 96-102.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 106-09.
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